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THE ROLE OF VALUATION IN FEDERAL 
BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTION PROCESS: THE SUPREME 
COURTREADSSCHEDULEC 
DAVID GRAY CARLSON• 
INTRODUCTION 
Under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules 11), a 
trustee or creditor has 30 days after the conclusion of the first scheduled creditors' 
meetings to object to the debtor's exemption of a thing from the bankruptcy estate 
(the "30-day deadline"). 1 The impact of this deadline has now been addressed twice 
by the United States Supreme Court. 
In Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, a debtor claimed that a civil rights lawsuit was 
exempt.2 The trustee, Robert J. Taylor, doubted its value and thought it unworth the 
trouble to challenge the exemption. 3 Later, following the debtor's win in the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court,4 a big settlement came in. Taylor brought an 
avoidance action against the debtor and her attorneys to recover the proceeds. 5 The 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
1 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(l) (2006) (providing "a party in interest may file an objection to the list of
property claimed as exempt within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors held under § 
341 (a) is concluded or within 30 days after any amendment to the list or supplemental schedules is filed" 
unless court "extend[s] the time for filing objections"); Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2010) 
("Subject to exceptions not relevant here, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure require interested 
parties to object to a debtor's claimed exemptions within 30 days after the conclusion of the creditors' 
meeting held pursuant to Rule 2003(a). If an interested party fails to object within the time allowed, a 
claimed exemption will exclude the subject property from the estate even if the exemption's value exceeds 
what the Code permits." (internal citations omitted)). 
2 Taylor v. Freeland & Kranz, 503 U.S. 638, 640 (1992) (noting debtor exempted proceeds relating to
pending lawsuit from its schedule of assets). 
3 See id. at 641 ("Taylor decided not to object to the claimed exemption. The record reveals that Taylor 
doubted that the lawsuit had any value."). 
4 Winn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 462 A.2d 301, 305--06 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) (affirming Human
Relations Commission decision finding TWA discriminated against black female employee by denying her 
several promotions despite her qualifications), appeal dismissed, 515 A.2d 303 (1986). 
5 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz (In re Davis), 105 B.R. 288, 290 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989), af/'d, 118 B.R.
272, 273, rev'd, 938 F.2d 420, 426 (3d. Cir. 1991), af/'d, 503 U.S. 638, 642 (1992). The trustee proceeded 
under Bankruptcy Code section 549(a) and section 550(a). 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (2006) (allowing trustee to 
avoid certain transfers of estate property); id. § 550(a) (authorizing trustee to recover from transferee or any 
immediate of transferee). A section 549(a) avoidance assumes that someone had a power under state or 
federal law to convey an interest free and clear of the bankruptcy estate. See David Gray Carlson, 
Bankruptcy's Acephalous Moment: Postpetition Transfers Under the Bankruptcy Code, 21 EMORY BANKR. 
DEV. J. 113, 117 (2004) ("Section 549(a) avoidance becomes relevant if and only ifD or some other party 
has an identifiable power to dispose of the bankruptcy estate, free and clear of the trustee's interest."). Hence, 
this conveyance must be "avoided." If, however, the conveyance did not have the effect of defeating the 
trustee's property rights, then avoidance under section 549(a) is inappropriate. Id. at 118 (arguing Olsen v. 
Zerbetz, 36 F.3d 71 (9th Cir. 1994), inappropriately considered section 549(a) because debtor's conveyance 
of bankruptcy estate property had no possible effect on trustee's rights since debtor had no power over 
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debtor and her lawyers responded that the civil rights lawsuit had been entirely 
expelled from the bankruptcy estate through exemption, that the 30-day deadline for 
objecting to the discharge had passed, and that this statute of limitations prohibited 
the trustee's avoidance action. 6 
The lower courts sided with the trustee, 7 but the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that the trustee had a duty to object to the exemption. 8 Not having done so, 
lapse of the 30-day period negated the trustee's avoidance action. 9 "Deadlines may 
lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt parties to act and they produce finality," 
the Court opined. 10 So the debtor got away with an asset to which her creditors were 
largely (but not entirely) entitled. 11 Taylor is taken to mean that, if the debtor lists a 
blatantly non-exempt thing as exempt, and if the 30-day statute of limitations 
passes, the non-exempt thing is to be treated as if it were exempt. 12 
In the recent case of Schwab v. Reilly, the Supreme Court reached what seems 
at first glance to be an opposite result. 13 In Schwab, a debtor was entitled to a 
"wildcard" exemption of $10,225 (as was the debtor in Taylor). 14 Under this
provision, the debtor could exempt anything at all, so long as it was worth less than 
$10,225. 15 She was also entitled to exempt tools of the trade to the limit of $1,850. 16 
property). Rather, the trustee should bring a turnover proceeding under Bankruptcy Code section 542(a), or, 
if money has been converted to their own use by the defendants, the trustee should have proceeded to collect 
the tort debt under section S42(b). See generally Carlson, supra (suggesting section S42(a)-(b) gives trustee 
power to demand payment of debt or value transferred from estate after bankruptcy commencement without 
avoidance action). The fact that Taylor chose to proceed by avoidance constitutes a confession that the debtor 
did successfully exempt the entire lawsuit from the bankruptcy estate, such that it had to be brought back in. 
The better view is that the lawsuit never left the bankruptcy estate because the debtor, at most, exempted a 
monetarily limited portion of the lawsuit. 
6 In re Davis, 105 B.R. at 290. 7 Id. at 288. 
8 See Taylor, 503 U.S. at 643-44 ("Taylor cannot contest the exemption at this time .... If Taylor did not 
know the value of the potential proceeds of the lawsuit, he could have sought a hearing on the issue, see Rule 
4003(c), or he could have asked the Bankruptcy Court for an extension of time to object, see Rule 4003(b). 
Having done neither, Taylor cannot now seek to deprive Davis and respondents of the exemption."). 
9 Id. at 642 (1992) (holding trustee may not contest validity of claimed exemption once 30-day period has 
exrc,ired).
Id. at 644. 
ll See id. at 642 ("[D]ebtor did not have [the] right to exempt more than small portion of proceeds either 
under state law or under the federal exemptions specified in § S22(d)"). The debtor was entitled to the 
"wildcard" monetarily limited exemption in section 522(d). See infra text accompanying notes 14-15. 
12 See Pleasant v. TLC Liquidation Trust (In re Tender Loving Care Health Servs., Inc.), S62 F.3d 158, 163 
n.6 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Taylor, S03 U.S. at 639 (1992)) (holding that "bankruptcy trustee could not contest 
the validity of an exemption after the 30-day period ... had run, despite the fact that the debtor had no
colorable basis for claiming the exemption"); Ladd v. Ries (In re Ladd), 450 F.3d 751, 753 n.l (8th Cir.
2006) ("If the Trustee does not timely object to a claim of exemption, the property will be deemed exempt, 
even if there is no basis for the exemption."); In re Schoonover, 331 F.3d 575, 578 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Once the 
period expires, creditors are out of luck even if the claim of exemption is specious."); 
13 See Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2669 (2010) (holding trustee was not required to object to 
claimed exemption). 
14 Id. at 2657.
15 
Id. at 2671 n.2 ("The 'wildcard' exemption permits a debtor to shield her 'aggregate interest in any
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These she combined to create a total exemption of $12,075. 17 Under this combined 
exemption, she claimed restaurant equipment said to be worth $10,718. 18 The 
trustee, William G. Schwab, subjected the equipment to a valuation, which showed 
a value in excess of $10,225. 19 Nevertheless, he let the 30-day deadline pass.20 
Later, Schwab sought to liquidate the equipment to obtain the surplus to which the 
general creditors were entitled. 21 This time, the Supreme Court held that the 
deadline was not an impediment and the trustee could indeed hold an auction. 22 The 
equipment could be expelled from the bankruptcy estate-but only insofar as the 
quantitative limit of $12,075 was not exceeded. 23 The surplus beyond that limit 
would remain inside the bankruptcy estate. 24 According to the majority in Schwab, 
Taylor and Schwab are distinguishable and therefore harmonious holdings.25 
Any bankruptcy lawyer reading Schwab will find the opinion obtuse and 
difficult. It seems to be a squabble between the majority and the minority on how 
to read Schedule C. Schedule C is the official form wherein a debtor claims 
exemptions pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 522(/).26 It is safe to say that never 
has the Supreme Court endowed an official judicial form with such extraordinary 
attention. But, underneath the exceedingly fine points about details of the forms, 
Schwab stands for an entire re-theorization of the Bankruptcy Code's exemption 
procedures. In this new vision, judicial valuations play no part. And because this is 
so, the 30-day deadline for objecting to exemptions will rarely have any bite. 
In this article, I compare Taylor and Schwab and conclude that these cases are 
not reconcilable. The lower courts in Schwab were well-justified in ruling for the 
debtor on the basis of Taylor. They could not be faulted for failing to anticipate the 
Supreme Court's overruling of its own precedent. In fact, the Schwab Court should 
property' she chooses, up to the stated dollar limit. ").1 Id. (authorizing $1,850 as maximum trade-tools exemption pursuant to I I U.S.C. § 552(d)(6) (2006)).
11 Id. at 2671. 
18 Id. at 2657-58. 19 Id. at 2658.
20 Id. at 2658 & n.2 (acknowledging trustee did not comply with thirty-day exemption objection period
under Rule 4003(b ), after which time subject property shall be excluded from bankruptcy estate, even if its 
value exceeds statutory cap). 
21 Id.
22 Id. at 2663, 2665-66. Or, more precisely, the Schwab majority thought that passage of the 30-day period 
was no impediment to the auction. Id. at 2662. It remanded the case and invited the debtor to consider 
perhaps other reasons why there should be no auction. Id. at 2669. 
23 
Id. at 2668 n.21 ("Section 54 l is clear that title to the equipment passed to Reilly's estate at the
commencement of her case, and§§ 522(d)(5) and (6) are equally clear that her reclamation right is limited to 
exempting an interest in the equipment, not the equipment itself."). 
24 Id. at 2669 ("Schwab was not required to object to Reilly's claimed exemptions in her business 
equipment in order to preserve the estate's right to retain any value in the equipment beyond the value of the 
exempt interest."). 
25 See id. at 2666-67 ( differentiating Taylor where debtor did not list estimated value of claimed exemption
from case at hand). 
26 According to section 522(/), "[t]he debtor shall file a list of property that the debtor claims as exempt 
under subsection (b) of this section." 11 U.S.C. § 522(/) (2006). 
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have excused the overruled Third Circuit for .following Taylor, should have 
apologized for wrongly deciding Taylor, and should have announced that Schwab 
constitutes the birth of a new era in which federal exemption law is restored to a fair 
and rational equilibrium (after an 18 year interregnum). 
Taken on its own, Schwab reaches a good and fair result, in spite of three 
dissenters who wished to perpetuate the bad old days of Taylor. Schwab coheres 
deeply with a theory of the bankruptcy estate, which I have been trying to propound 
for several years now. According to this theory, the trustee's personal property 
interest in the bankruptcy estate is the interest of a lien creditor. 27 The trustee's lien 
always attaches to monetarily limited exemptions, even when value is estimated to 
be below the quantitative limit of the exemption.21'1 No lien, however, attaches to an 
"in-kind" exemption. 29 The exemption of the entire "thing-in-itself' expels the item
from the bankruptcy estate once and for all, once the 30-day deadline has passed. 30 
The exempt thing-in-itself is a priori exempt.31 The monetarily limited exempt 
thing is not.32 In both Taylor and Schwab, the debtor claimed a monetarily limited
exempt thing. 33 In both cases, the trustee's lien survived the exemption and should 
have vindicated the trustee's ability to obtain the surplus beyond the monetary limit 
of the exemption.34 Only in Schwab was the validity of the lien recognized.35 
This Article is divided into five parts. In Part I, I give some state-law 
background. In Part II, I set forth the federal bankruptcy regime for exemptions. In 
Part III, I consider whether a judicial valuation of property claimed to be exempt 
has any part to play in the federal exemption regime. Parts IV and V review the 
Taylor and Schwab opinions. They conclude that, although these cases are not 
reconcilable, exemption law has been restored to good sense and restful 
equilibrium. 
27 See David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy's Organizing Principle, 26 FLA. STATE UNJV. L. REV. 549, 552
(1999) [hereinafter Carlson, Bankruptcy's Organizing Principle} (arguing strong-arm power under section 
544(a) "is the bankruptcy trustee's status as hypothetical judicial lien creditor on the frrst day of the 
bankruptcy petition"). 
28 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(l) (providing hypothetical judicial lien on all property).
29 See infra note 83.
30 
According to section 522(!), "[u]nless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such 
list is exempt." 11 U.S.C. § 522(!). 
31 Id. 
32 See Carlson, Bankruptcy's Organizing Principle, supra note 27, at 618 (arguing only debtor's equity in
the exempt property up to monetary limit is what is actually exempted, and leftover equity reachable by 
judicial lien). 
33 See Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2657 (2010) (discussing how debtor claimed kitchen equipment
as exempt); Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 640 (1992) (recalling how debtor claimed expected 
proceeds from lawsuit as monetarily limited exemption). 
34 See Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2661 (preserving lien where no exemption objection obligation); Taylor, 503
U.S. at 641---42 (deciding case based on trustee's untimely exemption objection). 
35 See Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2661 (concluding trustee had no exemption objection obligation where debtor's
business property claimed as exempt). 
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I. THESTATELAWBACKGROUND
From time immemorial, legislatures have declared some property so sacred and 
dear to the human soul that they forbid the sheriff from levying upon it. 36 In New
York, for example, the family bible is one of the items off limits to debt 
enforcement.37 In Oklahoma, the sheriff may not levy on 11 [t]en hogs[] that are held
primarily for personal, family or household use .... 1138 
Total exemption of a thing invites over-investment in it.39 And this leads to
debtor skullduggery-sometimes called "exemption planning. 114° For instance, if
residential real estate (i.e., the homestead) is totally exempt, as it is in some states,41
then insolvent debtors have cause to convert remaining liquid assets into the 
homestead, thereby shielding this wealth from the creditors. 42 
To prevent such debtor tactics, states often put monetary limits on exemptions. 
For instance, in New York, a debtor's homestead exemption is limited to $50,000. 43 
There are, then, two exemption regimes. One places the thing-in-itself beyond the 
reach of creditors.44 In this model, no judicial lien ever attaches to the thing-in­
itsel£45 No judicial lien ever smudges the pages of the family bible in New York46 
or the ten hogs of Oklahoma. 47
36 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § l(A)(15) (2010)(discussing specific property sheriff cannot levy upon). 
37 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5205(a)(2) (McKinney 2010) (exempting family bible from use to satisfy money
judgments). But, as we shall see, plumbers can snatch the bible from the debtor, even if most other creditors 
can't. See infra note 46. 
38 OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § l(A)(15).
39 See Hon. A. Jay Cristo! et al., Exemption Planning: How Far May You Go?, 48 S.C. L REV. 715, 738 
(1997) ("[W]e see the mischief created by an ability to include an asset by name rather than amount. Capping 
total exemptions would cure this problem along with the others described above."). 
40 See id. at 721-22 ( describing debtors who knowingly used uncapped total exemptions to retain luxurious 
assets). 
41 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(l) (exempting homesteads situated on 160 contiguous acres); see
also Hyman v. Plotkin (In re Hyman), 967 F.2d 1316, 1319 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992) (summarizing national 
homestead patterns). 
42 See, e.g., Ford v. Poston (In re Ford), 773 F.2d 52, 54 (4th Cir. 1985) (highlighting debtor's efforts to 
convert non-exempt property to homestead exempted property). A favorite tactic is to pay down the mortgage 
on the homestead, thereby increasing exempt debtor equity. See In re Anderson, 386 B.R. 315, 317 (Bankr. 
D. Kan. 2008) (sustaining homestead exemption where debtor disposed of property to pay down mortgage); 
see also Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Limitations: A Tale of Two Solutions, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 229 
(1997) (discussing cases where debtor liquidated nonexempt assets to purchase homestead).
43 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206(a) (McKinney 2010) ("[Homestead) not exceeding fifty thousand dollars ... is 
exempt from application to the satisfaction of a money judgment .... "). 
44 
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5205(a) ("[P]ersonal property ... is exempt from application to the satisfaction ofa 
money judgment .... 'l 
45 See id.
46 Actually, in New York, plumbers can get a judicial lien on the bible. See N.Y. C.P .L.R. § 5205(a)(2)
(providing exemption when judgment "recovered by a domestic, laboring person or mechanic for work 
performed by that person in such capacity'?; see also infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
47 OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § l(A)(15). 
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The other model places a debtor's interest in a thing (as measured by a monetary 
value) beyond reach of the creditors, but it generally permits the judicial lien to 
attach.48 There it sits, like a cat in the weeds, waiting for the songbird of
appreciation value to take wing. So where the equity in a New York homestead is 
thought to be worth less than $50,000, a judicial lien always attaches to the house. 49 
If a sheriff or receiver cannot obtain a bid better than $50,000, there can be no 
sale. 50 But the lien never goes away (as a matter of state law). 51 It lives on until the 
value increases sufficiently to justify the execution sale. 52 Once someone is willing 
to bid more than $50,000, the sale can occur.53 In such a case, the debtor obtains
$50,000 off the top.54 The sheriff takes the rest for the creditor whose judgment is 
being executed. 55 
IL EXEMPT PROPERTY AND THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE 
The commencement of a bankruptcy case is a transfer. By virtue of a 
bankruptcy petition, nearly all pre-petition property of a debtor becomes property of 
the bankruptcy estate, over which a trustee presides. 56 But what kind of transfer is
it? Does the debtor convey a fee simple absolute to the trustee? This view is 
occasionally asserted,57 but is hard to defend for many reasons.58 A better view is 
48 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206(d) ("The exemption of a homestead is not void because the value of the
property exceed fifty thousand dollars but the lien of a judgment attaches to the surplus."). 
41 
Id. 50 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206(e) (providing sale of homestead with value exceeding fifty thousand dollars); 
see also David Gray Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment Part One: Liens on New York Real Property, 82 
ST. JOHN'S L. REV 1291, 1385 {2008) [hereinafter Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment I] (noting under 
New York homestead exemption when "homestead has equity worth less than $50,000 after all senior liens 
' are considered, there can be no sale"). 
! ;
51 See N. Y. C.P .L.R. § 5206( d) (providing how judicial lien attaches to debtor's homestead where
homestead's value exceeds $50,000).52 
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206(e) (stating judgment creditor may commence special proceeding for sale of 
homestead where homestead's value exceeds $50,000). 53 
See id.; see also Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment I, supra note 50, at 1385 (noting under New 
York's homestead exemption, homestead cannot be sold if equity worth less than $50,000 after all senior 
liens have been considered). 
54 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206(e) (providing judgment debtor shall be paid $50,000 from proceeds of judicial sale 
of homestead, exempt for one year after payment, as representing his or her interest in proceeds); see also
Levinson v. R & E Prop. Corp., 395 B.R. 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ("New York's homestead exemption is 
simply the right to receive the first $50,000 in proceeds .... The balance of proceeds, if any, is paid to the 
judicial lien creditor."). 55 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5236(g) (McKinney 2010) (noting upon homestead sale, sheriff shall distribute proceeds
according to judgment creditor priority); see also In re Giordano, 177 B.R. 451, 457 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) 
("New York's Homestead Exemption is simply the right to receive the first [$50,000] in proceeds after the 
satisfaction of consensual liens. The balance of the proceeds, if any, is to be paid to the judicial lien creditor. 
If there is not [$50,000] available after payment of the consensual liens, so be it."). 
56 Exceptions are set forth in Bankruptcy Code section 541(b). 11 U.S.C. § 541(b) (2006). In these
exceptions are retirement and ERISA plans of the debtor. Id. § 541(b)(7)(B)(i)(D. See generally John 
Hennigan, Rousey and the New Retirement Funds Exemption, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 777 (2005). 
57 
In re Szekely, 936 F.2d 897, 900 (7th Cir. 1991) (asserting trustee's fee simple absolute ownership of 
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that the debtor transfers a lesser interest. Since the trustee is a creditor 
representative, it is natural to view the transfer as being in the nature of a lien. For 
example, the trustee obtains a lien on the debtor's pre-petition house. 59 He has the 
right to sell it, but not the right to collect rent from the debtor prior to selling it, as 
lien creditors have no right of possession. 60 
Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, a trustee had a judicial 
lien on all of the debtor's non-exempt property. 61 In those days, the family bible 
never went into the bankruptcy estate and never suffered the attachment by the 
trustee's lien. The trustee simply had no right to the bible ab initio.62 As to the 
limited real estate exemption, the trustee did have a lien as defined by state law, but 
it was subject to the prior charge of the debtor's monetary exemption, if that is what 
state law provided.63 
The Bankruptcy Code muddied considerably the crystalline vision of the 
Bankruptcy Act. First, it indicated that all property of the debtor went into the 
bankruptcy estate.64 This premise comes from section 541(a)(l) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which provides: 
(a) The commencement of a case ... creates an estate. Such estate
is comprised of all the following property, where located and by
whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and ( c )(2) of this
section all legal or equitable interests of the debtor 111 
property as of the commencement of the case .... 65 
debtor's house, but inconsistently denying that debtor is trespasser who must pay rent). 58 For example, why does the debtor have the right to any surplus under 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(6) ifthe trustee
is the fee simple owner? 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(6) (granting debtor surplus property only after all other debts are 
paid). Only the fee simple owner has the residual right. This residual owner must be the debtor, not the 
trustee. See generally Carlson, Bankruptcy's Organizing Principle, supra note 27, at 565. 59 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) ("The trustee shall have ... the rights and powers of ... (I) a creditor that ... obtains
... a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained .... "). 
60 See Vladimir Elgort, Note, Do Debtors Owe Rent to their Bankruptcy Trustee for Remaining in the 
Home After Filing and Prior to Foreclosure, Notwithstanding a Homestead Exemption?, 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2253, 2263, 2274 (2002) (proposing courts view trustees as mortgagees rather than fee simple holders 
entitled to rent co l\ection from debtors).
61 See Carlson, Bankruptcy's Organizing Principle, supra note 27, at 557 (discussing how 1898 Bankruptcy 
Act created "the view that the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding constituted a transfer to the trustee 
in the nature of a judicial lien").
62 See id. at 616-20. 
63 See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544, 548 (1898) (repealed 1978) ("This Act shall not
affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the State laws in force at the 
time of the filing of the petition in the State wherein they have had their domicile for the six months or the 
greater portion thereof immediately preceding the filing of the petition."). 
64 See 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(l).
65 ld. 
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Since the debtor admittedly has a property interest in the family bible, into the 
bankruptcy estate it goes. 66 The trustee's lien attaches to the family bible after all.
Equally, the limited exemptions go in entirely. 67 The trustee's lien therefore attached
both to the surplus and also to the debtor's quantitative share of the thing. 
After the creation of the estate, the Bankruptcy Code requires the debtor to fetch 
back the exempt property. 68 If the debtor doesn't petition to do so, the exempt
property remains in the bankruptcy estate for the trustee to liquidate. 69 If the petition
is made, however, and if no one objects to the exemptions within the 30-day 
deadline, the exempt property is expelled from the bankruptcy estate. 70 
Once expelled, the exempt property, in its post-bankruptcy mode, still receives 
federal protection. According to section 522(c): 
Unless the case is dismissed, property exempted under this section 
is not liable during or after the case for any debt of the debtor that 
arose, or that is determined under section 502 . . . before the 
commencement of the case ... .7 1 
The section goes on to make exceptions for lien creditors and for family creditors.72
Putting these exceptions aside, property successfully exempted is off limits to pre­
petition unsecured creditors, even where the debtor is utterly denied a discharge of 
debt.73 
66 See Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320,325 (2005) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(l)).
67 In re Smith, 640 F.2d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 1981) (characterizing section 541 as "major change" from old
Act because Code includes exempt property in estate). 
68 See Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2663-64 (2010) ("[E]xemptions represent the debtor's attempt to
reclaim those assets .... "); Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308 (1991) ("An exemption is an interest 
withdrawn from the estate (and hence from the creditors) for the benefit of the debtor."). 
69 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(l) ("[A]n individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the property . 
. . . "); id. § 522(1) (requiring debtors claiming exemptions to file exemption schedule with court). Dependents 
are invited to step in and exempt the debtor's property. Id. ("If the debtor does not file such a list, a dependent 
of the debtor may file such a list, or may claim property as exempt from property of the estate on behalf of 
the debtor."). 
70 
Id. § 522(1) ("The debtor shall file a list of property that the debtor claims as exempt under subsection (b)
of this section .... Unless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt."); 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b) (providing 30-day deadline). 
71 
id. § 522(c).
72 See id. § 522(c)(l)-(4) (enumerating exceptions). In fact, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) basically repeals state exemptions (as well as bankruptcy 
exemptions) for family creditors. See id. § 522(c)(l) ("[N]otwithstanding any provision of applicable 
nonbankruptcy law to the contrary, such property shall be liable for a debt of a kind specified in section 
523(a)(5). "). See generally Alan M. Ahart, The Liability of Property Exempted in Bankruptcy for Pre-petilion 
Domestic Support Obligations After BAPCPA: Debtors Beware, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 233, 233-34 (2007) 
(explaining how BAPCPA gives domestic support creditors superior rights against exempt property than 
previously provided under state exemption law). 
13 In re Scott, 199 B.R. 586, 594-95 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996) (holding debtor entitled to exemption even 
where plaintiff holds nondischargeable intentional tort claim). A case that sits uneasily on this divide (and 
one that is cited with approval by the Schwab court, Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2652 n.4 (2010), is 
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One may ask, if the discharge is denied and the case is closed, isn't it obvious 
that the pre-petition creditors and even the post-petition creditors must lay off the 
exempt property? After all, the property in question is exempt from creditors. 
Alas, the matter is not so simple. The Banlcruptcy Code gives debtors the option to 
choose federal exemptions. 74 When these are chosen, an exempt thing may be
federally exempt but not exempt as a matter of state law. 75 Section 522(c) serves to
vindicate the federally exempt item from post-bankruptcy state legal process. 76
Williams v. Peyton (In re Williams), 104 F.3d 688,689 (4th Cir. 1997), where the debtors claimed a tenancy 
by the entirety as exempt. Tenancies by the entireties, when they are exempt, are never exempt from the joint 
creditors of both spouses. In re Williams, 104 F.3d at 690. The debtors in In re Williams claimed the 
exemption as exempt from all creditors. Id. at 689. In other words, they equated the tenancy with the in-kind 
exemption like the family bible. See id. The trustee never objected to the exemption. Id. The court held that 
the trustee did not need to object and that the trustee could administer the exempt property for the benefit of 
the joint creditors. Id. at 690 ("[B]y specifically claiming an exemption under section [522(b)(3)(B)], 
Williams merely claimed an exemption to which she was legally entitled-the exemption of her tenancy by 
the entirety from the claims of her non-joint creditors."); accord, Napotnik v. Equibank & Parkvale Sav. 
Assn, 679 F.2d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating Pennsylvania state law allows creditors to reach entirety 
property to satisfy debts of joint creditors). Doing so, of course, adhered to the benefit of the individual 
creditors of each spouse, whose pro rata claim on the rest of the bankruptcy estate would have been 
increased. 11 U.S.C. § 726(c) (''Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) ofthis section, if there is property of 
the kind specified in section 541 (a)(2) of this title ... such property or proceeds shall be segregated from 
other property of the estate, and such property or proceeds and other property of the estate shall be distributed 
. .. "). It is far from clear, however, that the Bankruptcy Code permits exemption from some.creditors, but 
not others. See Lazerow v. Lazerow (In re Lazerow), 119 B.R. 74, 77 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990) (noting joint 
property can be exempt from individual creditors but not joint creditors). It clearly permits total in-kind 
exemption of things-in-itself, when the law permits, or monetarily limited exemptions. See 11 U.S.C. § 
S22(b)(2}-(3) (enumerating exemptions). But it does not so clearly contemplate that the trustee can enforce 
the rights of some unsecured creditors against an exempt item. In re Covington, 368 B.R. at 40 (claiming 
family creditors could reach exempt asset, but trustee could not use this as pretext to avoid exemption). In 
New York, "a domestic, laboring person or mechanic" can get the family bible. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 520S(a). 
Williams stands for the proposition that the trustee might keep the bible in the bankruptcy estate so that it 
might be sold for the benefit of the plumber-a doubtful proposition. See Williams, 104 F.3d at 690 (finding 
trustee may administer such joint property for benefit of creditors). See generally David Gray Carlson, 
Critique of Money Judgment (Part II: Judicial Liens on New York Personal Property), 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 
43 (2009) [hereinafter Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment II] (exploring New York rules concerning 
exemptions). 
The Supreme Court reads Williams as "holding that interested parties have no duty to object to a 
claimed exemption where the dollar amount the debtor assigns the exemption is facially within the range the 
Code allows for the type of property in issue." Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2652 n.4. In fact, the exemption in 
Williams was an in-kind exemption against some (but not all) general creditors. Williams, 104 F.3d at 689-90 
(claiming exemption applied to individual creditors only). It involved no dollars amounts at all. Id. at 689 
("[A)lthough Williams claimed an exemption for her $48,600 interest in the real estate, she exempted that 
interest only from the claims of her non-joint creditors, and not from the claims of her joint creditors."). 
74 See 11 U.S. C. § 522(b ), (p ). 
75 Id. 
16 Id. § 522( c). Several courts have recently declared ''bankruptcy-only" exemptions unconstitutional. In re
Pontius, 421 B.R. 814, 823 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2009) (holding Michigan's homestead exemption violated 
Supremacy Clause); In re Regevig, 394 B.R. 498, 500 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2008) (observing bankruptcy 
exemption-defining ability rests solely with Congress); see also In re Applebaum, 422 B.R. 684,697 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. 2009) (Markel, J., dissenting) (concluding Congress did not authorize states to enact bankruptcy-only 
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Congress has also authorized state legislatures to prohibit their citizens from 
choosing the federal exemption. This is the so-called "opt-out" provision of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 77 So far, 33 of the 50 states have "opted out."78 Only in 16 states 
(plus two territories and the District of Columbia) may debtors choose federal 
exemptions. 79 One of these states is Pennsylvania, 80 in which both the Taylor and 
the Schwab cases originated. 
Section 522( c) protects federally exempt items, but it also serves to protect 
debtors who illegally list non-exempt assets on Schedule C (where the 30-day 
limitation period passes without the trustee's protest). Taylor is supposed to be an 
example of this, 81 though our close inquiry of that case will reveal otherwise.
Thanks to section 522(c), pre-petition creditors cannot get at non-exempt assets, if 
they are claimed to be exempt and the 30-day period for objection lapses. 82 
To recapitulate, in spite of the innovations of the Bankruptcy Code, it is clear 
that when the debtor retrieves from the bankruptcy estate an in-kind exemption such 
as the family bible, the bible emerges entirely free from the trustee's judicial lien. 83
But not so the house, if the exemption is monetarily limited. 84 The trustee's lien 
attaches to the surplus in the house. 85 
For this reason, the trustee can sell the house to obtain non-exempt debtor 
equity. 86 But, pursuant to state law, this judicial foreclosure is subject to the debtor's 
under state law thanks to section 522(c). See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (disabling creditors from debt collection on 
exempted property). 
77 Id. § 522(b)(2) (defming state "opt-out" exemption provision); see Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308
(1991) (noting federal exemptions in section 522(d) apply "unless the State 'opts out' of the federal list" under 
section 522(b )(2) ). 
78 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ,r 522, at 522.02 n.5 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th
ed. 2009). 79 See Ahart, supra note 72, at 238.
80 See id 
81 See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 643-44 (1992) (precluding trustee from recovering
property improperly listed as exempt).8 
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (protecting exempt property from pre-petition creditors). 
83 See, e.g., Henry E. Hildebrand III, In re Reilly: A Tale of Two Exemptions: Supreme Court Grants Cert
to Reexamine Taylor v. Freeland & Kranz, 28 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 12 (June 2009) (noting in-kind 
exemption exempts "entire listed property, without regard to its value or any dollar limitation under law"). 
84 See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
85 See, e.g., N.Y. · C.P.L.R. § 5206(d). I must acknowledge a most esoteric gap in the theory of the
bankruptcy estate. The trustee's hypothetical judicial lien is described by section 544(a), where we learn that 
"the trustee shall have ... the rights and powers of ... (1) a creditor that ... obtains •.. a judicial lien on all 
property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such a judicial lien." 11 U.S.C. § 
544(a). A creditor on a simple contract claim, however, cannot obtain a judicial lien on in-kind exemptions. 
See Carlson, Bankruptcy's Organizing Principle, supra note 27, at 619 ("Judicial liens on exempt property 
are 'void' under section 522(t)(l)(A)."). Nevertheless, the exemption goes into the bankruptcy estate all the 
same. See id. at 617 ("Today, all exempt property enters the bankruptcy estate. The exemptions must be 
claimed by the debtor after the fact. Only then does the exempt property leave the estate."). While the 
property is there, and before the 30-day objection period to Schedule C runs out, it is hard to say the trustee 
has a judicial lien on the basis of section 544(a)(l). See id. at 620 (explaining potentially exempt property 
goes into bankruptcy estate because of section 54I(a)(3) rather than by trustee's hypothetical judicial lien). 
86 See Soost v. NAH, Inc. (In re Soost), 262 B.R. 68, 72 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001) ("[W)here an asset such as a
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senior charge for the exemption amount. 87 The trustee must therefore pay the
exemption amount to the debtor before retaining the surplus for the general 
creditors. 88 
Oddly, nothing in section 522 actually commands the trustee to hand over a 
cash equivalent to the debtor. 89 So presumably the command for the trustee to do so
comes from state law. That is, the trustee is a hypothetical judicial lien creditor 
under state law.90 When the trustee sells pursuant to section 363(b) with court
permission, state law compels the trustee to hand the cash over to the debtor. 91 In 
New York, the cash proceeds of the debtor's exempt interest in the real estate is 
itself exempt for one year.92 If the money is used to buy a new homestead, the
exemption continues. 
93 Unfortunately, state law does not always have a proceeds
rule.9 Nor is there any governing theory for the federal exemptions of section 
522(d), where they are permitted.95 To my knowledge, however, trustees universally
assume that they have to give cash equivalents to the debtor, when they foreclose on 
monetarily limited exemptions.96 
homestead is involved, claiming an exemption of a specific dollar value does not render the homestead 
immune from sale by the trustee in bankruptcy even though the trustee has not objected to the claimed 
exemption."). 
87 See Carlson, Bankruptcy's Organizing Principle, supra note 27, at 570 (explaining distribution of cash, 
subject to section 725, after sale of a debtor's property, where debtor, as "an entity other than the estate," has 
an interest in surplus and must receive it ''before final distribution ... under section 726"). 
88 
See Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 26S2, 2667 (2010) ("[T]he debtor will be guaranteed a payment in the
dollar amount of the exemption."). 
89 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2006) (listing only monetary limit of exempt property).
90 
Id. § 544(a)(l) (giving trustee power of hypothetical judicial lien creditor). 
91 See, e.g., Hyman v. Plotkin (In re Hyman), 967 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging 
homestead sale only permissible under California law where exemption limit was exceeded and debtor was 
first entitled to sale proceeds covering exemption), abrogated on other grounds, Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 
2652, 26S9 (2010). 
92 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § S206(e) ("Money, . . paid to a judgment debtor, as representing his interest in the 
proceeds, is exempt for one year after the payment .... "). 
93 See id. 
94 See Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment I, supra note SO, at 1386--90 (discussing lack of proceeds rule 
in New York for mortgage foreclosure sales that generate surpluses). 
95 
In re Healy, 100 B.R. 443,445 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1989) (recognizing section 522(d)(l) does not exempt 
proceeds from sale of homestead). 
96 New York has a state-law precedent that actually interferes with this conclusion. See First Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Brown, 434 N.Y.S.2d 306, 310 (App. Div. 1980) (indicating proceeds from foreclosure sale 
are not exempt). In Brown, a debtor granted a mortgage to A and lost a judgment to JC. Id. at 308. A then 
foreclosed and sold to X for a price large enough to generate a $8,667 surplus. Id. Before the surplus was 
distributed, the debtor filed for bankruptcy. Id. Since, at the time, New York provided a $10,000 real estate 
exemption, the debtor claimed that the entire surplus was "real estate" and therefore awardable to the debtor. 
Id. at 308-09 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206(a)). The Brown court, however, ruled that, once the homestead 
was sold in foreclosure, the proceeds were personal property. Id. at 310. As New York has no exemption for 
cash, the amount was awarded to JC. Id.
The debtor had the last laugh by amending her exemption schedule to switch from the state-law 
exemption to the wildcard federal exemption of Bankruptcy Code section 522(d)(S), which in those days 
permitted the exemption of any property worth up to $7,900. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) (2006). Furthermore, 
the debtor could use Bankruptcy Code section S22(f) to avoid the judicial lien because it impaired her 
. 1 
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We saw earlier that a state lien creditor · may hang back and wait for 
appreciation value to accrue to the quantitatively limited exemption. 97 For example, 
if the New York homestead is worth only $40,000, the lien creditor must wait until 
the value increases.98 Then, years or even decades later, the lien creditor can swoop 
in and execute on the judgment, obtaining any amount over $50,000.99
Bankruptcy provides a tool to prevent this. Under section 522(f)(l)(A), a 
debtor may avoid a judicial lien to the extent it impairs an exemption. 100 
"Impairment" is carefully defined to allow the debtor any post-petition
appreciation. 101 Liens may partially survive avoidance under section
522(f)(l)(A). 102 The policy of section 522(f) is to guarantee to the debtor post­
petition appreciation value. 103 
But what of the trustee with a judicial lien on the homestead? May a trustee 
close a case and wait in the weeds for decades, until appreciation value accrues and 
exemption of the proceeds. See Brown v. Dellinger (In re Brown), 734 F.2d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 1983). 
Effective September 1, I 982, the New York legislature deprived its citizens of their right to elect federal 
exemptions in bankruptcy. See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW§ 284 (McKinney 2001).' The debtor's amendment 
to her exemption schedule occurred in 1980. See Brown, 734 F.2d at 121-22. Therefore, the debtor's 
maneuver cannot be repeated. See Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment I, supra note 50, at 1386-88.
97 
See id. at 1385 ( discussing inability of state lien creditor to sell property when equity is less than 
quantitatively limited exemption amount). 
98 See id. ("Where, however, the homestead has equity worth less than $50,00 after all senior liens are
considered, there can be no sale." (citing Reda v. Voges, 596 N.Y.S.2d 147 (App. Div. 1993))). 
99 
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5203(b) (McKinney 2010) (providing courts may extend lien period beyond ten
years where more time is needed for real property sale). Liens might have to be renewed for this to happen, 
but this is easily done. See Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment I, supra note 50, at 1307-12.100 
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)( 1 )(A). 
mt Section 522(f)(2)(A) provides that: 
[A] lien shall be considered to impair an exemption to the extent that the sum of­
(i) the lien;
(ii) all other lien on the property; and
(iii) the amount of the exemption that the debtor could claim ifthere were no
liens on the property; 
exceeds the value that the debtor's interest in the property would have in the absence of 
any liens. 
Id. � 522(f)(2)(A). 10 See id. § 522(f)(l)(A) (providing debtor may not avoid judicial liens securing domestic support 
oblifations). 10 See In re Hanger, 217 B.R. 592, 594-96 (B.AP. 9th Cir. 2003) (explaining 1994 amendment made 
section more debtor-friendly by allowing them "the full benefit oftbe exemption and the benefit of any post­
avoidance appreciation in the value of the property"). For example, suppose the debtor claims $50,000 of a 
house as a monetarily limited exemption. The house is worth $250,000. It is encumbered by a $230,000 
mortgage. Suppose further that JC has a valid judicial lien for $1 million, which has attached to the house. In 
bankruptcy, JCs lien impairs the debtor's exemption, according to the formula of section 522(b )(2). Under 
that formula, we are to calculate the sum of (i) the targeted lien ($1 million), (ii) all other valid liens 
($230,000), and the amount of the exemption ($50,000). The required sum is $1,280,000. From this sum we 
subtract the value of the house ($250,000). The resulting difference is $1,030,000, which is the avoidance to 
which the debtor is entitled. Accordingly, we reduce the lien by $1,030,000. Since the avoidance amount 
exceeds the lien, the lien is entirely avoided, and the debtor enjoys all post-bankruptcy appreciation value. 
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then reopen the case to auction off the property? 104 Although the trustee's lien is not 
subject to section 522(f) avoidance, the trustee's lien disappears under the 
provisions of section 554(c), which states: 
Unless the court orders otherwise, any property scheduled under 
section 521(ll05l of this title not otherwise administered at the time 
of the closing of a case is abandoned to the debtor and administered 
for purposes of section 350 of this title. 106 
Abandonment is, curiously, not statutorily defined, but it is best understood as the 
trustee's release of his lien. 107 So when a case is closed, the trustee's lien is released, 
and the trustee cannot ordinarily appear decades later to reclaim appreciation 
value. 108 This is conditioned, however, on the property in question being scheduled 
by the debtor on her Schedule B, as required by section 52l(a)(I)(B)(i). 109 
We have already confessed to one embarrassment: section 522 has no express 
proceeds theory. We must now admit to a second embarrassment, heretofore 
unacknowledged. According to Bankruptcy Code section 544(a)(3), the trustee is 
no mere lien creditor but is a bona fide purchaser of real estate. 110 Ttpically, state
exemptions are not valid against purchasers, such as mortgagees. 1 We should 
certainly view the trustee as a purchaser of real estate but not a purchaser of fee 
simple absolute. The trustee should be viewed as a lien creditor because she is a 
creditor representative. 112 In short, the purchase of the trustee is the purchase of a 
104 See 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (2006) (stating closed case may be reopened "to administer assets, to accord
relief to the debtor, or for other cause"). 
105 BAPCPA renumbered section 521(1) as section 52l(a)(l), and failed to correct this cross-reference. 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of2005, § 106(d), 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(l). 
106 11 U.S.C. § 554(c). According to Bankruptcy Code section 350(a), "After an estate is fully administered
and the court has discharged the trustee, the court shall close the case." Id. § 350(a). 
107 
See Carlson, Bankruptcy's Organizing Principle, supra note 27, at 613 (describing abandonment as "a
renunciation of the trustee's judicial lien on assets"). 
108 Catalano v. Comm'r, 279 F.3d 682, 686 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[A]bandonment is revocable only in very 
limited circumstances, such as 'where the trustee is given incomplete or false information of the asset by the 
debtor, thereby forcing a proper investigation of the asset."' (quoting Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936, 946 (9th 
Cir. 2001))). But see Polis v. Getaways Inc. (In re Polis), 217 F.3d 899, 901-04 (7th Cir. 2000) (suggesting 
Jack of debtor disclosure before case closed may warrant its revival); Stoebner v. Wick (In re Wick), 249 
B.R. 900, 914-15 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000) (allowing trustee to reopen a case to obtain surplus value in 
exempt property where debtor prevaricated about property), ajfd on other grounds, 276 F.3d 412,413 (8th 
Cir. 2002). 
109 See Vreugdenhill v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 950 F.2d 524, 526 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding property 
must be properly scheduled before close of case in order to be abandoned). 
110 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (2006) ("The trustee shall have . .. the rights and powers of ... a bona fide 
purchaser of real property .... "). 
111 
See, e.g., Rade v. Denver Pub. Sch. Credit Union (In re Rade), 205 F. Supp. 336,339 (D. Colo. 1962)
("[W]here a mortgage is executed on exempt property, the prevailing view seems to consider the exemption 
waived by implication."). 
112 See Carlson, Bankruptcy's Organizing Principle, supra note 27, at 558 (discussing Congress's 1910
strong-arm power, under which trustees were apotheosized as ideal lien creditors because, "[a)s 
!: 
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mortgage--a consensual lien on real estate. Debtor exemptions are no good against 
mortgages or other purchases. They are only good against judicial lien creditors. 
Hence, the implication of section 544(a)(3) is that real estate exemptions do not 
exist in bankruptcy. 
Why did Congress enact section 544(a)(3)? In 1978, Congress thought that 
unrecorded liens should be void in bankruptcy. 113 But unrecorded mortgages were
usually perfectly good against the trustee's hypothetical judicial lien. In New York, 
for example, judicial liens are junior to unrecorded mortgages. 114 So section 
544(a)(3) was added to void the unrecorded mortgage. This was probably 
inadvisable and unnecessary, as voidable preference law adequately performs the 
same task.115 
Be that as it may, an unintended side effect of section 544(a)(3) is that the 
exemption procedure in bankruptcy becomes impossible to explain with regard to 
real property. To see why, let us strip section 522(b) of irrelevant plumage and 
examine it on the assumption that state opt-out legislation applies: 
(1) Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor
may exempt from property of the estate the property listed in ...
paragraph (3) .... 
(3) Property listed in this paragraph is -
(A) ... any property that is exempt under Federal law,
other than subsection (d) of this section, or State or local
law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition
116 
Ii So we are to look at state or local law to see what is "exempt." How does one tell 
from state law that property is "exempt"? Exempt from what? 117 Typically, state 
re�resentative of creditors, the trustee succeeds to creditor power as well as to debtor property").
13 See In re England Motor Co., 426 B.R. 178, 193 n.12 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2010) ("Congress added § 
544(a)(3) to the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 to render unrecorded transfers of real property invalid against the 
trustee in bankruptcy."). 
114 
See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. Malin, 802 F.2d 12, 24 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding unrecorded separation 
agreement transferring property is "ineffectual as against its subsequent lien"); United States v. Certain Lands 
Located in Hempstead, 41 F. Supp. 636, 637 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) (stating unrecorded title by deed executed 
before judgment entry takes precedence over judgment); Sullivan v. Com Exch. Bank, 154 A.D.2d 292, 296 
(App. Div. 1912) ("[A]n unrecorded conveyance has a preference over a judgment unless there is a superior 
equity in favor of the holder of the latter."). 
115 
See 1 GRANT GILMORE & DAVID GRAY CARLSON, GILMORE AND CARLSON ON SECURED LENDING: 
CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY §I.IO, at 64 (Aspen Publishers, Inc. 2000) (stressing section 544(a)(3) simply 
duplicates voidable preference law, which has made unrecorded real estate conveyances into voidable 
preferences since 1938). 
116 I l U.S.C. § 522(b)(l), (3)(A) (2006). 117 In a provision relating to tenancy by the entireties, the Bankruptcy Code expands slightly and refers to
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law uses the term in connection with property that is placed beyond the reach of 
judicial process for debt enforcement. 118 The problem is that state law testifies that
mortgage liens cannot be affected by exemption statutes. 119 And meanwhile section
544(a)(3) indicates that the trustee himself is a mortgage lender or (on the view I 
disfavor) a fee simple owner. 120 Does that not mean that section 544(a)(3) overrides 
the right of any debtor to a real estate exemption? 
Although the judiciary in bankruptcy cases is much taken with the "logic" that 
is internal to the law, logic sometimes gives out, as it does here. Through a deep 
and unspoken conspiracy, no trustee has ever made this claim. And undoubtedly, in 
enacting section 544(a)(3), Congress did not intend to deprive debtors of their real 
estate exemptions. Indeed, after BAPCP A, such a congressional intent is proven by 
various federal overrides of real estate exemptions added by BAPCPA. For 
example, according to new section 522( o ): 
For purposes of subsection (b)(3)(A), and notwithstanding 
subsection (a), the value of an interest in-
(1) real ... property that the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor uses as a residence ...
shall be reduced to the extent such value is attributable to any · 
portion of any property that the debtor disposed of in the 10-year 
period ending on the date of the filing of the petition with the intent 
to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor and that the debtor could not 
exempt, or that portion that the debtor could not exempt, under 
section (b ), if on such a date the debtor had held the property so 
disposed of. 121
Under this provision, the debtor's real estate exemption is reduced, under the 
specified conditions. 122 So there must be an exemption in place that section 522( o) 
might reduce, in spite of the implications of section 544(a)(3). Let's just say that 
"exempt from process." Id. § 522(b)(3)(B). 
118 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5205(a) ("The following personal property when owned by any person is
exempt from the application to the satisfaction ofa money judgment .... "). 
119 See, e.g., John T. Mather Mem'l Hosp. v. Pearl, 723 F.2d 193, 193 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing New York
homestead exemption law capping property "not exceeding ten thousand dollars in value above liens and 
encumbrances" (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206(a))). 
120 See In re Sullivan, 387 B.R. 353, 358 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008) (noting trustee assumes mortgagee's 
position after avoiding mortgage under section 544); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ,r 544.05, at 544-16 to 17 
(Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009) (suggesting section 544(a)(3) gives trustee all 
rights of bona fide purchaser which, by extension, includes legal title holder upon bankruptcy filing). 
121 11 U.S.C. § 522(0) (emphasis added). 
122 See id. (reducing real estate exemption to extent of property of which debtor improperly disposed, or 
portion not exempted under section 522(b)). 
'l' 
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section 544(a)(3) erases itself from the Bankruptcy Code when it is time to read 
section 522 on exemptions. These two provisions cannot be read together in a 
holistic manner. 
Ill. THE ROLE OF VALUATION IN EXEMPTIONS 
There is a matter we must discuss before we examine the Supreme Court's 
reading of Schedule C in Schwab. We must pause to consider the role of valuations 
in section 522. For the purposes of section 522, section 522(a)(2) provides: 
"[V]alue" means fair market value as of the date of the filing of the 
petition or, with respect to property that becomes property of the 
estate after such date, as of the date such property becomes 
property of the estate. 123 
Notice that this definition of value is linked to a specific antecedent time. All other 
references to value in the Bankruptcy Code either refer to the present time 124 or are
simply unlinked to any time.125 Only section 522(a)(2) links value to a precise
historic time. And herein is a major impediment to a holistic and sensible reading 
of section 522. The Schwab majority implies that valuation plays no role in 
exemption procedure. 126 Why, then, did Congress bother to define value for the
purposes of section 522? Has section 522(a)(2) been read out of the Bankruptcy 
Code? 
"Value" is a word that appears often throughout section 522. Let us work with 
a typical example, although many could have been chosen. Suppose a debtor is 
entitled to the federal exemption of section 522(d). According to the "jewelry" 
exemption of section 522(d)(4), the debtor may exempt 
[t]he debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed [$1,350] in value, in
jewelry held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of
the debtor or a dependent of the debtor. 127 
Suppose now that a debtor has a qualifying gem worth exactly $1,000 (as of the day 
of the bankruptcy petition), and such a value is duly listed on the debtor's Schedule 
C. The exemption becomes final because the 30-day objection period has lapsed.
123 Id. § 522(a)(2). 
124 See, e.g., id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (valuing hypothetical chapter 7 dividend in context of plan 
confmnation "as ofthe effective date of the plan"). 
125 See, e.g., id.§ 506(b) (providing value of secured property without reference to time).
126 Schwab v. Reilly 130 S. Ct 2652, 2663 n.8 (2010) ("Challenges to the valuation of [assets] ... are not
covered by Rule 4003(b) .... Challenges to 'property claimed as exempt' as defined by the Code are covered 
by Rule 4003(b) .... Our holding is confined to this point."). 
127 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(4). 
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The trustee, however, has found a buyer who will pay $1,500 for the gem.128 May
the auction proceed? This becomes the precise question in Schwab.
No less than three interpretations of section 522 are possible, given the 
invocation of "historic" value in section 522(a)(2). 
(1) One interpretation is that the auction may proceed and the debtor is limited
to $1,000, because that was the value of the debtor's aggregate interest on the day of 
the banlauptcy petition. On this day, the trustee's hypothetical lien attaches to the 
gem. The gem has increased in value, and the trustee enjoys the appreciation value 
above $1,000. On this vision, the trustee exploits the debtor's low-ball valuation on 
Schedule C. 
One would like to say that, if the auction is appropriate, the debtor should 
receive $1,350 in proceeds, not $1,000, because her entitlement is "not to exceed 
$1,350." But $1,350 refers to the maximum the debtor can have given the valuation 
on auction day ($1,500), not on the day of the bankruptcy petition ($1,000). So, 
according to this first interpretation, valuation as declared by the debtor on 
Schedule C is the maximum entitlement. 
(2) Contrary to the above, it is possible to assert that, since on the day of the
bankruptcy petition, the gem was worth $1,000, the trustee's hypothetical lien on the 
gem is worth zero. Being worth zero, it does not exist. Under this interpretation, a 
monetarily limited exemption becomes an in-kind exemption (at least where the 
valuation is below the monetary limit in the relevant statutef 
In other contexts, courts assume (tendentiously) that a lien worth zero is no lien 
at all. 129 In chapter 13 cases, the debtor is not permitted to modify claims "secured
only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal interest. 11130
A junior mortgage may exist that is completely underwater. It would seem that 
these mortgages too cannot be modified in chapter 13. A mortgage is still a 
mortgage even if it is out of the money, for the moment But a large majority of 
courts think that a junior home mort�age lender whose lien is completely
underwater is not a secured creditor at all. 1 1 
128 These were the facts of Gebhart v. Gaughan (In re Gebhart), Nos. 07-16769, 07-35704, 2010 WL
3547641, at *1-2 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010), although the case involved a house that appreciated in value since 
the beginning of the case. 
129 See Lane v. W. Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d 663, 664 (6th Cir. 2002) (determining
lienholder's claim depends on whether interest in collateral has economic value). 
130 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2); see also Zimmer v. PSB Lending Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1227
(9th Cir. 2002) (concluding wholly unsecured lier. not protected by anti-modification provision); Lane v. W. 
Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3.d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding modification of unsecured loans 
permitted); Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass'n (In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 295 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(holding unsecured lienholder not afforded anti-modification protection); Pond v. Fann Specialist Realty (In 
re Pond), 252 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 200 I) (finding lienholder's rights not subject to anti-modification 
protection); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 615 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding anti­
modification clause does not apply to wholly unsecured mortgage). 
131 Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass'n (In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 288-89 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(collecting authorities supporting majority view). 
'·i•'' 
.•,··: 
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Applying this questionable premise to the trustee's hypothetical judicial lien, if 
the trustee has no lien (because it has no market value), then the gem is entirely out 
of the bankruptcy estate, and there can be no auction after the 30-day deadline has 
passed. In short, valuation changes the exemption from a monetarily limited 
exemption to an in-kind exemption. 
To my eye, this is a category mistake. Property interests worth zero are still 
property interests. A mortgage lien worth nothing is still a power to sell the debtor's 
equity position, even if a buyer at the foreclosure sale would pay a nominal value. 
Such a buyer at state law is actually buying a possible future upside, if the 
purchased property increases in value. And, applying this insight to the trustee's 
hypothetical lien, this, too, should be viewed as encumbering a monetarily limited 
exemption, even when the value of the thing-in-itself is less than the statutory limit. 
(3) A third interpretation-the one adopted by the Schwab majority-holds that
valuation plays no part in the exemption process. 132 Where the debtor lists a
monetarily limited exemption, the limited interest is indeed exempt, but the trustee's 
lien attaches to the exempt thing. 133 On this view, the auction of our gem can go
forward, and the debtor can have the statutory maximum of $1,350. Most, but not 
all, appreciation value belongs to the trustee. The debtor obtains $350 of 
appreciation to fill out the monetary exemption of $1,350. The trustee obtains the 
surplus of $150. But this interpretation would seem to deprive section 522(a)(2) of 
all bite. In such an interpretation, historic value of the gem on the day of the 
bankruptcy petition (or as of any time) does no work. Historic value is entirely 
otiose. The only work done is the dollar limit as set forth in the exemption statute 
itself. Under this interpretation, a court never has cause to make any valuation of 
the exempt thing. 
This interpretive conundrum figured in Polis v. Getaways Inc. (In re Polis). 134
There, the debtor listed a cause of action as exempt under Illinois's "wildcard" 
exemption for personal property. 135 Given other claims, the debtor was entitled to a 
monetarily limited exemption of $900 from this source. 136 This she used to shield a
lawsuit under the Truth in Lending Act. 137 The value of this lawsuit was listed as
"unknown."138 The bankruptcy case was closed, and the debtor became a class­
action plaintiff against the offending travel agent. 139 In alliance with the class action
132 
See Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2010) (observing section 522(b) does not refer to 
estimated market value); Gebhart, 2010 WL 3547641, at *3--4. 
133 
See Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2661-62 (exempting property up to defined dollar amount, not exempting 
actual item). 
134 217 F.3d 899 (7th Cir, 2000).
135 





Polis v. Getaways, Inc., 242 B.R. 653, 654-55 (N.D. Ill. 1998), rev'd, 217 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2000). 
139 Polis v. Getaways, Inc., No. 98-C-1808, 1999 WL 135302, at *l (N.D. Ill Mar. 3, 1999), rev'd, 217 
F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2000).
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defendant, the trustee attempted to reopen the case to challenge the exemetion, in
order to take back the lawsuit. 140 The lower courts granted the trustee relief. 41 
In remanding the case, Judge Richard Posner assumed that the entire lawsuit 
had been expelled from the bankruptcy estate if, on the day of the bankruptcy 
petition, the lawsuit was actually worth less than $900. 142 So, Judge Posner assumed 
that the second interpretation described above was true. According to Judge 
Posner: 
The judges who ruled against [the debtor] were plainly 
disturbed by the prospect of windfall gains to a debtor who by 
virtue of having exempted a legal claim from bankruptcy and thus 
put it beyond the reach of her creditors emerges from bankruptcy 
owning free and clear what turns out to be a valuable asset. But 
that possibility is built into the valuation scheme that the 
Bankruptcy Code uses to determine whether a debtor has exceeded 
her exemption. The Code provides that the "value" of property 
sought to be exempted "means fair market value" on the date the 
petition was filed ... On the date [the debtor] filed her petition in 
bankruptcy, she had not yet sued ... but the legal claim on which 
the suit was based, having arisen out of a transaction ... that had 
occurred before the petition was filed, was already "property" of the 
debtor and hence of the debtor's estate in bankruptcy .... 
The possibility that the debtor will obtain a windfall as a 
consequence of the exemptions recognized by the Bankruptcy Code 
arises from the fact that the date of valuation of an asset for 
purposes of determining whether it can be exempted is the date on 
which the petition for bankruptcy is filed; it is not a later date on 
which the asset may be more. Often a property appreciates in a 
wholly unexpected fashion . . . And so it is with a legal claim. It 
might when it frrst accrued have seemed so "far out" that its fair 
market value would be well within the limited of the exemption, 
and yet-such are the uncertainties of litigation-it might turned 
into a huge winner. 
This feature of the Code's valuation should not be thought a 
disreputable loophole. If the assets sought to be exempted by the 
140 
Polis, 242 B.R. at 65S. Reopening was based on the fact that the debtor had amended Schedule C late in 
the case and did not notify the trustee before the case was closed. Id. Ordinarily, under section 554(c), this 
would have constituted an abandonment of the trustee's lien, but the lower courts were willing to reverse the 
abandonment under the circumstances. See Polis, 242 B.R. at 65S. 
141 
See id. at 6S6 (determining debtor's lawsuit could be exempted up to statutory maximum). 
142 
In re Polis, 217 F.3d at 903. 
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debtor were not valued at a date early in the bankruptcy proceeding, 
neither the debtor nor the creditors would know who had the right 
to them. So long as the property did not appreciate beyond the 
limit of the exemption, the property would be the debtor's; if it did 
appreciate beyond that point, the appreciation would belong to the 
creditors, who thus might-if they still remembered their continent 
claims to the property-reclaim it many years after the bankruptcy 
proceeding had ended. 
143 
Judge Posner's remarks therefore assume that the court must value assets as part 
of the exemption procedure. On remand, apparently, the trustee would have an 
opportunity to object that the value of the lawsuit was more than $900. 144 If so, the 
trustee's hypothetical lien would attach to the surplus. 145 But if the lawsuit was 
worth less than $900, then the lawsuit would be entirely expelled from the 
bankruptcy estate. 146 The trustee's lien would not attach to it, and the debtor could 
keep all appreciation value. 147 
Now there is something absurd about this vision. Suppose the court decides 
that the value of the lawsuit on the day of the bankruptcy petition was $901. The 
trustee wins all appreciation value of the lawsuit and comes up a big winner. But 
suppose the value is $899. Now the lawsuit is entirely expelled from the 
bankruptcy estate. 148 All appreciation value belongs to the debtor personally-as 
Judge Posner emphasized. This absurdity is an unavoidable consequence of the 
second interpretation. 
Another oddity is that, if the debtor reports a value above the monetary limit, 
the debtor apparently concedes that the trustee has a hypothetical judicial lien on the 
exempt thing. The monetarily limited exemption is thus not converted into an in­
kind exemption. Only when the debtor reports a low value below the limit does the 
:) monetarily limited exemption magically transform into an in-kind exemption. 
Supposedly, this magic emanates from the debtor's report of value on Schedule C. 
This second interpretation leads to the view that the trustee must challenge a 
valuation by the debtor within the 30-day deadline, in order to prevent the 
143 Id. at 902-03 (emphasis added). In the italicized language, perhaps Judge Posner overlooks the ordinary 
effect of section 554(c). When a case is closed, the trustee abandons his lien; absent the unusual circumstance 
present in Polis, see supra note 140, abandonment cannot be reversed. Woods v. Kenan (In re Woods), 173 
F.3d 770, 778 (10th Cir. 1999) (conditioning abandonment revocation on higher threshold imported from 
FED. R. ClV. P. 60(b)).
144 In Polis, the 30-day objection period was tolled for the debtor's lack of disclosure. 242 B.R. at 655.
145 
In re Polis, 217 F.3d at 903. 
146 Id. at 904.
147 
Id. at 903. 
148 I compared this second interpretation to the underwater second mortgage in chapter 13. The same 
dilemma exists. If the second mortgage is a dollar in the money, it cannot be modified. But if it is out of the 
money by a dollar, the mortgage lender is an unsecured creditor. See Zimmer v. PBS Lending Corp. (In re
Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1226 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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transformation of the monetarily limited exemption into an in-kind exemption. A 
judicial valuation as of the day of the bankruptcy petition becomes necessary to the 
exemption process, whenever a below-limit value is reported. 
Significantly, all this stems from the odd definition of value in section 
522(a)(2), which ties value to the historic moment when the bankruptcy petition 
was filed. That definition steered Judge Posner toward the second interpretation, 
which was the position of the Schwab dissent. 149 But did Congress intend to signal 
the transformation of monetarily limited exemptions into in-kind definitions by 
defining "value" in such a peculiar way? This is a question that the Schwab 
majority implicitly answers with a "no." 150 
IV. TAYLOR
The Supreme Court often finds itself explaining its past decisions, in an attempt 
to prevent misinterpretation by the lower courts. In this vein, the majority opinion 
in Schwab consists of a lengthy interpretation of the Taylor opinion. 151 The Schwab 
majority reads Taylor to mean that, if the debtor absurdly names a thing that no one 
believes is exempt, and if the 30-day deadline passes, the debtor keeps the property 
and is protected forever by section 522(c) from any pre-petition creditor. 152 But, 
under Schwab, the debtor who names a monetarily limited exemption does not get 
the entire thing. 153 The trustee still has a judicial lien on the surplus · of the real 
exemption, because the 30-day objection period has no bearing on the surplus 
beyond a genuine statutorily limited exemption. 154 Given the Schwab reading of 
Taylor, does this distinction between in-kind and monetarily limited exemptions 
enjoy a valid statutory basis? 
I have said that the definition of section 522(a)(2) is a disturbing factor in 
developing a coherent statutory interpretation of section 522. I will return to the 
implications of this provision later. But for section 522(a)(2)'s insistence on a 
historic value, it would certainly appear that the majority in Schwab has a quite 
coherent view of the exemption mechanism. The Schwab majority views the entire 
matter as interpreting what the debtor is claiming when she lists an asset as exempt 
on her Schedule C. 155 The irony is that Schwab cannot be distinguished from 
149 Wherein Judge Posner is cited with approval. Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2675 (2010) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Polis, 217 F.3d at 903). 
150 See id. at 2663 n.10 (majority opinion) (viewing debtor's schedule entries as in-kind exemptions "would
unnecessarily treat the exemption as violating the limits imposed by the Code"). 
151 See id. at 2666-67.152 
Id. at 2666 ("In Taylor, the questi�n concerned a trustee's obligation to object to the debtor's entry ... 
that was not plainly within the limits the Code allows."). 
153 See id. at 2662 (limiting exemption to interest in equipment and not equipment per se). 
154 See id. at 2661-63 (stating thirty day objection period does not apply when asset's market value within
statutory limit, but does apply when asset's value exceeds statutory limitations). 
155 See Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2661-62 (2010) (arguing exemption categories applicable to 
Reilly's case are monetarily limited exemptions rather than categorical exemptions). 
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Taylor. They are exactly the same case. The Third Circuit was therefore justified 
in following Taylor when it supported the debtor's claim against Schwab. The 
Supreme Court was equally justified in ovem11ing Taylor as bad law (as it is the 
sovereign privilege of the Supreme Court to change its mind). The Schwab 
majority wrongfully claims, however, that Taylor and Schwab are reconcilable. 
They are not. Properly, Schwab overrules Taylor, which was wrongly decided. 
As the Schwab majority did, let us examine the Schedule B-4 156 in Taylor: 
TYQe of ProI!erty 
Proceeds from 
Lawsuit 
Claim for lost 
wages 
Taylor's Schedule B-4 
DescriI1tion Statutory Value 
Authoritv 
Winnv. TWA 11 u.s.c. $Unknown m 
522(b )( d) [sic] 
Unknown 158 
In claiming the lawsuit, the debtor in Taylor asserted that section 522( d) justifies the 
exemption. 159 Being a Pennsylvania resident, she was entitled to choose the section 
522(d) option. 160 
According to the Schwab majority, this entry onto Schedule B-4 was clear 
notice to Taylor that the debtor was planning skullduggery. 161 This notice triggered 
the trustee's duty to object to the exemption or be forever foreclosed. 162 By contrast,
in Schwab, the trustee was not put on any such notice and therefore had no duty to 
object.163 As it were, the Taylor filing put a thumb in the eye of the trustee, yet the
156 In 1984, the time of the bankruptcy petition, this schedule was designated Schedule B-4. Id. at 2664 &
n.14 ("Indeed, it was not until 1991 that Schedule B-4 was redesignated as Schedule C and amended to
require the estimate of market value on which Reilly so heavily relies .... The precise reason for the 
amendment is unclear."). The column headings have been shortened from the actual appearance in the form. 
Also, over the years, the dollar amounts in the statutes have changed. At the risk of anachronism, I am 
pretending that Taylor is governed by the 2010 statutes and their monetary amounts. 
157 This row of the form is based on Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2665.
158 This row, not mentioned in Schwab, is based on the verbal account in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503
U.S. 638,640 (1992). 
159 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz (/11 re Davis), 105 B.R. 288, 293 (Bankr. W.D. Pa, 1989), ajfd, 118 B.R.
272,273, rev'd, 938 F.2d 420,426 (3d. Cir. 1991), ajJ'd, 503 U.S. 638, 642 (1992). 
160 See In re Allan, 431 B.R. 580, 583 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2010) (noting because Pennsylvania is not "opt­
out" state, residents have option to elect federal exemptions in bankruptcy proceedings). 
161 See Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 n.16 (2010) (citing Barroso-Herrans v. Lugo-Mender (In re 
Barroso-Herrans), 524 F.3d 341, 345 (1st Cir. 2008)) (stating entries labeled "unknown" should raise red flag 
with creditors). 
162 See id. at 2662 & n.7. 
163 Id. at 2661-62.
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trustee did not respond. The Schwab filing, however, thrust no thumb into the eye 
of the trustee. Therefore, the trustee had no duty to object to the exemption. 
In my view, the Supreme Court majority in Schwab is unconvincing as to what 
can be learned from the Taylor filing. Column 1 shows that the debtor was 
claiming a lawsuit. Lawsuits are mentioned in section 522(d)(l 1). An award under 
a crime victim's reparation law, for example, is included. 164 Wrongful death,
personal injury, and lost future wage "payments" (but not a lawsuit to compel 
payment) are likewise mentioned. 165 These are all monetarily limited.166 I assume
that "payment" in section 522(d)(ll) is a clumsy way of saying that the lawsuit to 
compel a future payment is also exempt ( even though the payment has not yet been 
accomplished). Apart from section 522(d)(ll), section 522(d)(5) allows a 
monetarily limited "wildcard" exemption. 167 The debtor can claim any property as
exempt according to the following monetary limit. 168 According to the modern
version of section 522(d)(5): 
The debtor's aggregate interest in any property, not to exceed in 
value [$1,150] plus up to [$10,825] of any unused amount of the 
[real estate] exemption provided under paragraph (1) of this 
subsection. 169
So, in reading the Taylor schedule, the trustee could conclude that Winn v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc ("Winn v. TWA") 170 might be in the nature of a limited personal­
injury-style lawsuit under section 522(d)(ll), or that this lawsuit is a wildcard 
claim. Nothing on this form is absolutely conclusive of the debtor's intent to claim 
an inappropriate exemption. 
164 
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(I l)(A) (2006).
165 
See id. § 522(d)(l l)(B), (D)-(E).166 The wrongful death and future wage "payments" are limited to what is reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor and her dependents. See id. § 522(d)(l l)(B), (E). The personal injury "payment" may 
not exceed $21,625. See id. § 522(d)(ll)(D); Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code 
Prescribed Under section 104(a) of the Code, 75 Fed. Reg. 8747, 8748 (Feb. 25, 2010) (adjusting amount to 
$21,625, pursuant to section 104(a)). 
167 




Id. As the Supreme Court explains:
The 1994 version of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) allowed debtors to exempt an "aggregate 
interest in any property, not to exceed in value $800 plus up to $7,500 of any unused 
amount of the [homestead or.burial plot] exemption provided under[§ 522(d)(l))." In 
2004, pursuant to § 104(b)(2), the Judicial Conference of the United States published 
notice that § 522(d)(5) would impose the $975 and $9,250 ($10,225 total) limits that 
governed Reilly's April 2005 petition. In 2007 and 2010 the limits were again 
increased. 
Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 n.1 (2010) (citations omitted). 
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A prudent trustee will use the occasion of the creditor's meeting to ask about the 
nature of Winn v. TWA. The trustee, Robert J. Taylor, did just that and found out 
that it was a civil rights lawsuit.171 Armed with this information, the trustee was
now on notice that the debtor must be claiming the lawsuit as a wildcard exemption, 
or perhaps the exemption under section 522(d)(l l)(E), relating to "loss of future 
earnings of the debtor." 172 As such, a monetarily limited exemption was validly 
claimed. 173
In the Schwab Court's revisiting of Taylor, the Court had this to say: 
The interested parties in Taylor agreed that this entry rendered the 
debtor's claimed exemption objectionable on its face because the 
exemption concerned an asset (lawsuit proceeds) that the Code did 
not permit the debtor to exempt beyond a specific dollar amount .... 
In Taylor, the question concerned a trustee's obligation to object to 
the debtor's entry of a "value claimed exempt" that was not plainly 
within the limits the Code allows.
174 
In other words, the debtor in Taylor put her thumb in the eye of the trustee, and the 
trustee was obliged to avenge the insult by objecting within the 30-day period. 
The accuracy of this reading must be questioned. The lawsuit could have had a 
very low value, given the probability of success, and therefore could have fit within 
the wildcard exemption 175 or perhaps the future wage exemption. If so, there was 
no "thumb in the eye 11 of Mr. Taylor. Indeed, whenever section 522(d) might be 
chosen in the 16 states that still allow it, the wildcard exemption alone indicates that 
anything claimed is rightfully exempted if the value is low enough. 
In Schwab, the Court put enormous stress on the fact that the debtor in Taylor 
listed the value of the claimed exemptions as "unknown." 
In holding [against Schwab, the trustee], the Court of Appeals 
focused on what it described as Taylor's "'unstated premise"' that 
111a debtor who exempts the entire reported value of an asset is 
claiming the "full amount," whatever it turns out to be."' But Taylor 
does not rest on this premise. It establishes and applies the 
straightforward proposition that an interested party must object to a 
171 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 640 (1992) (describing discussion between trustee and
debtor counsel at initial creditors meeting). 
172 
See id. at 642. 
173 
Id ("The parties agree that Davis did not have a right to exempt more than a small portion of these
proceeds either under state law or under the federal exemptions specified in § 522( d). "); id. at 648 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) ("[I]t is apparently undisputed that there was no legitimate basis for the claim of an exemption 
for the entire award."). 
174 
Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at2666 (citation omitted). 
175 As in Polis v. Getaways, Inc. (In re Polis), 217 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir. 2000) (using Illinois wildcard).
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claimed exemption if the amount the debtor lists as the 11value 
claimed exempt" is not within statutory limits, a test the value ($ 
unknown) in Taylor faile� and the values ($8,868 and $1,850) in 
this case pass. 176
Thus, "value unknown" in Taylor was supposed to be a red flag, warning the 
trustee that the debtor was up to skullduggery. 177 
This remark does not hold up under careful scrutiny. First, let me observe that 
the Supreme Court's remark suffers from conflating modern Schedule C with 











Value of Property 
Without Deduction 
Exemption 
In the above passage, the Court assumes the debtor in Taylor filled out schedule C 
and, in column 3, listed value as 11unknown." 178 Now, had the debtor in Taylor filled 
out modem Schedule C in this way, the trustee is supposed to be on notice that the 
debtor wishes to behave illegally. But this is not the case. Rather, the trustee is 
entitled to think that the debtor's lawyer was simply too lazy to look up and list the 
monetary exemptions set forth in section 522(d). There is no reason to think that 
the debtor wished to exceed the limits of the law just because those statutory limits 
are described as "unknown" to the debtor. 179 Be that as it may, the debtor in Taylor 
never did fill out modern Schedule C. 180 She filled out a much different schedule B-
4, which has no such column. In fact, on old Schedule B-4, the word ''unknown" is 
listed in the fourth column-labeled "Value." The debtor is simply reporting that 
she didn't know the value of the pending civil rights suit-a statement that is 
undoubtedly true, given its litigation posture. This does not signal the debtor's 
intent to claim more than the law allows. It is quite consistent with lawful activity. 
As the Schwab majority itself emphasizes, there is a "presumption that parties act 
176 Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2010). 177 Barroso-Herrans v. Lugo-Mender (In re Barroso-Herrans), 524 F.3d 341, 345 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Use of
terms like '100% of the property's value],' 'unknown,' 'to be determined,' 'tba' and '$1.00' are red flags to 
trustees and creditors."). 
178 See Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2666 ( citation omitted). 
179 
See Stoebner v. Wick (In re Wick), 276 F.3d 412, 416 (8th Cir. 2002) ("We reject Ms. Wick's 
contention that listing 'unknown' as the current market value of the exemptions is sufficient as a matter oflaw 
to make an asset fully exempt. Indeed, it may signal nothing more than that the asset has not been valued or 
that the debtor is unsure of how to come up with an accurate market value."). 
180 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 651 n,6 (1992). 
.;.:, 
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lawfully and with knowledge of the law. 11181 So, in Schwab, the Supreme Court is
quite unconvincing that Taylor and Schwab are at all distinguishable. 
Nevertheless, even if the Court's analysis of Taylor is not �onvincing, the 
positive law that emerges from its analysis is clear. Where, on the face of Schedule 
C, the debtor clearly manifests an intent to violate the law, the trustee must object to 
the exemption within 30 days or be forever barred.182 But where Schedule C is
facially lawful, the trustee sacrifices no rights by failing to object to the 
exemption. 183 The monetarily limited exemption is partially expelled from the
bankruptcy estate, but the trustee retains his lien on the surplus for the duration of 
the case until the case is closed. 184
V. SCHWAB
In Taylor, as re-read by the Schwab court, the debtor put her thumb in the eye 
of the trustee by claiming a blatantly illegal exemption. 185 This occurred because the
debtor listed as "unknown" the value of a lawsuit.186 Having failed to object, the
trustee was barred from seeking any proceeds of the civil rights lawsuit.187 We have
presented· very severe reasons to doubt this is true, but we will accept the analysis, 
for the purpose of the ensuing discussion. 
In Schwab, the debtor submitted the following Schedule C: 
Descri:gtion 









Value of Claimed 
ExemQtion 
1,850 
8 868 188 
, 





Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2666 (citing United States v. Budd, 144 U.S. 154, 163 {1892)). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. ("The amounts Reilly listed in the Schedule C column titled 'Value of Claimed Exemption' are 
facially within the limits the Code prescribes and raise no warning flags that warranted an objection.").184 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2006) (granting to trustee rights of hypothetical lien creditor). 
185 See Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2665-66 (citing Taylor, 503 U.S. at 642) (explaining debtor's claim was 
"objectionable on its face" when form did not include monetary value).1 6 
See id 
187 See id. at 2666. 
188 Id. at 2660. 
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The fourth column, confusingly put forth on Schedule C, seems to be calling for 
the market value of the entire thing as to which the debtor claims a monetarily 
limited exemption. 
As in Taylor, the trustee, William G. Schwab, executed his duty to 
investigate.189 He had obtained a valuation of $17,200 for the equipment.190
Let us pause and ask what would be the case if the debtor in Schwab had listed 
the value of the equipment as $17,200. Schedule C communicates the_ debtor's 
intent to claim monetarily limited exemptions on things worth more than the limit. 
There would be no required "thumb in the eye" here. 191 So where she lists a value 
less than the limit, there is even less reason to find a thumb in the trustee's eye. 192
As a result, the lapse of the 30-day objection period meant only that the debtor got 
what she asked for-a lawful exemption limited to $11,075 (the sum of Column 3). 
The trustee's lien on any surplus remained intact. Accordingly, the trustee had a 
power of sale that would endure so long as the case was not closed. No magic 
transformation of the monetarily limited exemption into an in-kind exemption 
occurs. 193 
189 Id at 2658.
!90 Id. 
191 The Supreme Court understated the matter in writing: "Sections 522(d)(5) and (6) further and plainly
state that claims to exempt such interests are statutorily permissible, and thus unobjectionable, if the value of 
the claimed interest is below a particular dollar amount." Id. at 2662 (footnote omitted). In fact, claims under 
section 522( d)(5) and ( 6) are valid no matter what the collateral is worth (though the claim in question is 
monetarily limited). Id. at 2663. Knowing this, the Schwab majority remarked that: 
Schwab was entitled to evaluate the propriety of the claimed exemptions based on 
three, and only three, entries on Reilly's Schedule C: the description of the business 
equipment in which Reilly claimed the exempt interests; the Code provisions governing 
the claimed exemptions; and the amounts Reilly listed in the column titled "value of 
claimed exemption." 
Id. The omitted column 4 is irrelevant whether it states a too-high or too-low amount. The purpose of column 
4, the Supreme Court opines, is to save the trustee the trouble of flipping to Schedule B to find out the value 
ofan item listed in Schedule C. Id. at 2664. 
192 The majority supported its conclusion by stating:
Treating such claims as unobjectionable is consistent with our precedents. See, e.g., 
Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320, 325 (2005). It also accords with bankruptcy court 
decisions holding that where, as here, a debtor claims an exemption pursuant to 
provisions that (like § 522( d)( 6)) permit the debtor to exclude from the estate only an 
"interest" in certain property, the "property" that becomes exempt absent objection, § 
522( /), is only the "partia I interest" claimed as exempt and not "the asset as a whole," 
e.g., In re Soost, 262 B.R. 68, 72 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001).
Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2663 n.9. 
193 The Schwab majority insists such a transformation does not take place. Monetarily limited exemptions
"define the 'property claimed as exempt' as an 'interest' in (the debtor's] business equipment, not as the 
equipment per se." Id. at 2662. 
We decline to construe ... exemptions in a manner that elides the distinction between 
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The Schwab majority, therefore, disagreed with the unanimous opinion of the 
lower courts. 194 None of the lower courts thought that the trustee's lien survived the 
30-day statute of limitations. 195 These courts considered the trustee's lien on the
surplus to be canceled at the end of the 30-day period.196 In its reading of Taylor, 191 
the Third Circuit cited with approval198 the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion in Allen v. 
Green (In re Green): 
Thus, an unstated premise of [the Taylor Court] was that a debtor 
who exempts the entire reported value of an asset is claiming the 
11:full amount," whatever it turns out to be. 199 
In short, the Third and Eleventh Circuit plausibly read Taylor to mean that, 
unless the debtor expressly denied seeking the whole thing, she is presumed to be 
[in-kind exemptions] and provisions such as §§ 522(d)(5) and (6), particularly based 
upon an entry on Schedule C-[the debtor's] estimate of her equipment's market 
value-to which the Code does not refer in defining the "property claimed as exempt." 
Id. at2663 (citation omitted). 
Viewing the entries otherwise, i.e., as exempting the equipment in kind ... no matter 
what its dollar value, would unnecessarily treat the exemption as violating the limits 
imposed by the Code ... , as well as ignore the distinction between those provisions and 
the provisions that [authorize in-kind exemptions]. 
Id. at2663 n.10. 
194 See id. at 2659. 
195 See In re Reilly, 534 F.3d 173, 174, 178, 180 (3d Cir. 2008) ("But once Rule 4003's 30-day period
elapsed without Schwab filing an objection or a request for extension, the property became fully exempt from 
the bankruptcy estate regardless of its ultimate market value."), afj'd, 403 B.R. 336 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2006), 
rev'd sub nom. Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010). 
196 See id. at 1 78. 
197 According to the Third Circuit, "it was important to the Taylor Court that the debtor meant to exempt
the full amount of the property by listing 'unknown' as both the value of the property and the value of the 
exemption .... "Id. Although the Third Circuit was right that the Taylor result demanded the same result in 
Schwab, it is not correct that the Taylor Court made something of the word "unknown." Indeed, the Taylor 
court merely mentions it and makes nothing of it. See Taylor v. Freeland & Kranz, 503 U.S. 638, 640 ( 1992) 
(using word "unknown" once to describe property's claimed value). And furthermore, on a careful reading of 
Taylor, the debtor said nothing at all about claiming more than the monetarily limited amount. Id. 
("[P]roperty [was described by debtor] as 'proceeds from lawsuit-[Davis] v. TWA' and 'Claim for lost wages' 
and [debtor] listed its value as 'unknown."'). Indeed, the Taylor Court was directly aware that Taylor's claim 
succeeded in bringing the lawsuit at least under the wildcard exemption. See id. at 648 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) ("[I] t is apparently undisputed that there was no legitimate basis for the claim of an exemption for 
the entire award."). Yet, nevertheless, the debtor in Taylor prevailed. 
198 The Third Circuit in In re Reilly praised the Eleventh Circuit's similar stance to its own on exemptions 
that claim the full value of an asset. 534 F.3d at 179. The Eleventh Circuit in Allen v. Green (In re Green), 31 
F.3d 1098, 1101 (11th Cir. 1994), abrogated by Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2010), held that an 
asset will become fully exempt from the bankruptcy estate when the debtor has demonstrated her intent to 
exempt the entire value of the asset from the estate and the trustee fails to object pursuant to Rule 4003.
199 31 F.3d at 1100.
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overreaching and must be challenged within the 30-day objection period. The Third 
Circuit was certainly correct that there is no real distinction between the Taylor 
schedule and the Schwab schedule. So the Third Circuit justifiably felt compelled 
to conclude that, per Taylor, the Schwab debtor was likewise entitled to the thing­
in-itself, not just the monetarily limited exemption. 
The Supreme Court in Schwab made clear that the key to the case was Column 
3.20
0 In Column 3, the debtor in Schwab claimed limited exemptions only. 201 
According to the Schwab majority: 
[A]n interested party must object to a claimed exemption if the
amount the debtor lists as the "value claimed exempt" is not within
statutory limits, a test the value ($ unknown) in Taylor failed, and
the values ($8,868 and $1,850) in this case pass.202
Helpfully, the Supreme Court gives advice to those debtors who wish to flaunt 
the law by making illicit claims with regard to monetarily limited exemption. 203 The
key is to write "full market value" in the third column: 
Where, as here, it is important to the debtor to exempt [illegally] 
the full market value of the asset or the asset itself: our decision 
will encourage the debtor to declare the value of her claimed 
exemption in a manner that makes the scope of the exemption clear, 
for example, by listing the exempt value as "full fair market value 
(FMV)" or 11 100% of FMV. 11 Such a declaration will encourage the 
trustee to object promptly to the exemption if he wishes to 
challenge it and preserve for the estate any value in the asset 
beyond relevant statutory limits. If the trustee fails to object ... , 
the debtor will be entitled to exclude the full value of the asset. 204
200 
See Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2663 ("[W]e conclude that Schwab was entitled to evaluate, .. the claimed
exemptions based on three, and only three, entries on Reilly's Schedule C: the description of [the
exemptions]; the Code provisions governing the claimed exemptions; and the amounts . .. listed in [Column
3] titled 'value of claimed exemption."' ( emphases added)). 
201 See id. at 2657-58. 
202 
Id. at 2666; see also id. at 2660 ("Schwab and the United States as amicus curiae argue that the Code 
specifically defines the 'property claimed as exempt' as an interest ... in a particular asset, not as the asset 
itself. Accordingly, they argue that the �lue of the property claimed exempt, i.e., the value of the debtor's 
exempt interest in the asset, should be judged on the value the debtor assigns the interest, not on the value the 
debtor assigns the asset."). 
203 See id. at 2668 (explaining how debtors can retain personal property by listing exempt items at full 
market value). Oddly, in Taylor, the Supreme Court threatens these same lawless debtors with civil and 
criminal sanctions. See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992). Now it gives advice to 
debtors on how to scam the system. See Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2668. 
204 Id. 
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Meanwhile, the fourth column was simply the debtor's estimate of the value of the 
entire thing-in-itself05 in which the debtor claimed a limited interest. 
The Schwab dissent, in contrast, insisted that Column 4 governs all: 
The Court's account, however, shuts from sight the vital part played 
by the fourth entry on Schedule C---current market value�when a 
capped exemption is claimed. A debtor who estimates a market 
value below the cap, and lists an identical amount as the value of 
her claimed exemption, thereby signals that her aim is to keep the 
listed property in her possession, outside the estate-in-banlcruptcy. 
In contrast, a debtor who estimates a market value above the cap, 
and above the value of her claimed exemption, thereby recognizes 
that she cannot shelter the property itself and that the trustee may 
seek to sell it for whatever it is worth. Schedule C's final column, 
in other words, alerts the trustee whether the debtor is claiming a 
right to retain the listed property itself as her own, a right secured to 
her if the trustee files no timely objection. 206 
But on the unimportance of Column 4, the majority is clearly in the right. Where 
Column 3 indicates that the debtor seeks only the statutory monetarily limited 
exemption, nothing in Column 4 is relevant. 207 If the debtor lists a high value or a 
low value, the key is Column 3. Similarly, if Column 3 claims all value (not just 
the statutory limit), 208 the Column 4 listing is likewise just as irrelevant. 209 
205 What Kant might have called "noumenal value." See generally IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE 
REASON 187 (J.M,D. Meiklejohn trans., Forgotten Books 2008) (1781). 
Z(J(i Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2673 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
207 See id. at 2663 (majority opinion) (explaining market value estimate on Schedule C serves only 
advisory function for trustee); see also id. at 2662 (finding section 522 describes exempted "property" as 
interest at specified dollar amount). Therefore, to be rejected is Barroso-Herrans v. Lugo-Mender (In re 
Barroso-Herrans), 524 F.3d 341,344 (1st Cir. 2008), where the debtor implausibly listed the value ofa cause 
of action as $4,000. The court held that the debtor was entitled only to $4,000. Id. at 346. But this column 4 
number should have been irrelevant. The debtor should have received the proper monetarily limited 
exemption that the law allowed. 
208 The Schwab dissent worries that this advice bids nai've consumer debtors to ignore the instruction that
Column 3 gives: "Chapter 7 debtors are often unrepresented. How are they to know they must ignore 
Schedule C's instructions and employ the 'warning flag' described today by the Court, if they wish to trigger 
the trustee's obligation to object to their market valuation in a timely fashion?" Id. at 2677 (Ginsburg, J. 
dissenting); see also Olson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 377 B.R. 865, 875-76 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007) 
(suggesting Schedule C does not clearly state how to claim assets in full but can be claimed if amount listed 
indicates intent to exempt in full). But given that we are dealing with cheating debtors who wish better 
entitlement than the law allows, why should the forms describe how debtors might best flaunt the system? 
The dissent (and even the majority) shows more concern for the welfare of bad faith debtors than one usually 
encounters in bankruptcy appellate opinions. Compare Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2668 (describing how debtors 
can claim assets by valuing them at "full fair market value"), and id. at 2677 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(arguing majority's recommendation to debtors to claim full market value is inconsistent with Schedule C's 
instructions), with Hyman v. Plotkin (In re Hyman), 967 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding debtors 
claimed only listed monetary value, not homestead itself). 
2010] THE ROLE OF VALUATION 491 
An issue that agitated the dissent was the exchange between Mr. Schwab and 
the debtor at the creditors' meeting in her case. According to the dissent: 
Her filing left no doubt that her exemption claim encompassed her 
entire inventory of kitchen equipment. Schwab, in fact, was fully 
aware of the nature of the claim Reilly asserted. At the meeting of 
creditors, Reilly reiterated that she sought to  keep the equipment in 
her possess ion; she would rather discontinue the bankruptcy
proceeding, she made plain, than lose her equipment. 210 
So the trustee knew that the debtor deplored an auction before the 30-day period 
was up. But why should this mean that he must object to the exemption to preserve 
the auction? The auction was his duty and right, if he thought the sale would yield a
surplus for the debtor.211 Just because the debtor has orally expressed her
disappointment at the exercise of this right does not mean the right must be 
vindicated by some further action within the 30-day deadline. The right exists and 
is fully vested, regardless of the debtor's subjective opinion ofit. 
The ma{ority's position is that the claimed exemption must be set forth on 
Schedule C. 12 The debtor's orally expressed disappointment in the prospect of an
auction cannot be taken as an amendment to Schedule C.213 In any case, it does not
follow that the debtor should be taken as demanding that she deserved more than 
the law deigned to give her. Upon being informed of new facts and the 
consequences of those facts, she did not respond by saying, "I demand more than I 
am entitled to." Rather, her response was to attempt to dismiss the bankruptcy. In 
fact, Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b) indicates that the debtor is expected to amend 
209 In this respect, the dissent misreads the majority opinion: "So long as a debtor values her claimed
exemption at a dollar amount below the statutory cap, the Court reasons, the claim is on-its-face permissible 
no matter the market value she ascribes to the asset." Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2672-73 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). Such a view would make column 4 relevant, which the majority thinks it is not. Id. at 2663 
(maJority opinion). 21 Id. at 2672 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Schwab informed Rei11y at the meeting of creditors that he planned to sell all of her 
business equipment She promptly moved to dismiss her bankruptcy petition, stating 
that her "business equipment ... is necessary to her livelihood and art, and was a gift to 
her from her parents." She "d[id] not desire to continue with the bankruptcy," she 
added, because "she wishe[ d] to continue in restaurant and catering as her occupation." 
The Bankruptcy Court denied Reilly's dismissal motion simultaneously with Schwab's 
motion to sell Reilly's equipment. 
Id. at 2671 n.3 (citations omitted). 
211 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(l), (f)(3) (2006) (stating trustee may, after notice and hearing, sell property of
estate, and may do so free and clear of liens if, inter alia, surplus is generated for estate). 212 See Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2668. 213 
Cf In re Cottingham, No. 95-32441-B, 1996 WL 288393, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Apr. 25, 1996)
("The debtor orally amended his exemptions, but should now do so in writing.''). 
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Schedule C, in which case a new 30-day period extends from the time of the 
amendment. According to Rule 4003(b ): 
[T]he trustee or any creditors may file objections to the list of
property claimed as exempt within 30 days after the conclusion of
the meeting of creditors held pursuant to Rule 2003(a), or the filing
of any amendment to the list or supplemental schedules unless,
within such period, further time is granted by the court. 214 
Rule 4003(b) indicates that the debtor has the duty to amend the schedule to change 
the nature of her claimed exemption, and that the trustee has 30 days from the 
amendment to object. 215 This the debtor in Schwab never did. 216 Indeed, Schwab 
notified the debtor expressly that she had failed to exempt the thing-in-itsel£217 Yet 
she did nothing to amend Schedule C. 218 
We have one last piece of business. We have emphasized the peculiar 
definition of value in section 522(a)(2) and how this provision inspired Judge 
Posner, avant la lettre, to adopt the position of the Schwab dissent. The Schwab 
majority never mentions section 522(a)(2).219 What does the Schwab majority imply 
about this provision? 
According to the Schwab majority, valuation figures only in Column 4. 220
Column 4 is advisory to the trustee only. There is no role for valuation in the 
exemption process and, for that reason, no need for the trustee to challenge the 
debtor's valuation in the 30-day period. This saves the trustee from making routine 
objections to the debtor's valuation (whenever the number is less than the statutory 
limit). 221 And, in any case, what would this hypothetical objection be? The trustee 
would simply be saying, "We think the value is higher. Give us more time to find a 
buyer to find out." Such an objection, if required, should always be granted. Why 
should a court value the claimed item when an auction is better suited to establish 
its actual realized value? But given this is always the nature of the objection, why 
214 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b) (emphasis added). 
215 See id 
216 See Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2671 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
211 See id. at 2671 n.3. 
218 See id. at 2671; Rosario-Farrula v. Wigberto (In re Barroso-Herrans), 524 F.3d 341,345 (1st Cir. 2008) 
("[I]n legal documents ambiguity is traditionally construed against the drafter, and that canon has special 
force in this context: after Taylor, a failure to object to a claimed exemption has very harsh consequences for 
the estate, and so it is most fair to place on the debtor the burden of claiming exemptions unambiguously. " 
(citing Hyman v. Plotkin (In re Hyman), 967 F.2d 1316, 1319 n.6 (9th Cir. 1992))). 
219 See Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2652-69. 
220 See id at 2661. 
221 See id. at 2661-62 (noting claimed exemption values need not reference estimated market value and 
trustee's objection duty only applies where claimed exemption exceeds statutory cap). As the majority 
emphasizes: "Where the debtor genuinely intended to claim nothing more than the face value of the exempt 
interest (which is rational if a debtor wishes to ensure that his aggregate exemptions remain within statutory 
limits), [the minority] approach would engender needless objections and litigation ..•• " Id. at 2668 n.18. 
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require it at all? Let the trustee go out and find a buyer in order to liquidate the 
surplus! This will settle once and for all the value of the item 222 
Given the majority view, section 522(a)(2) becomes a statute on how the debtor 
should advise the trustee as to the value of the exemption. Absurdly, the trustee 
does not usually care about historic value. He cares about the value at the time of a 
section 363(b) sale. Nevertheless, Column 4's precatory advice is to be governed by 
this historic challenge. In most cases, none of this makes a difference, especially 
when personal property is at stake. Personal property usually depreciates in value. 
So a report of the historic value will tend to be overly optimistic. The trustee can 
make some sense of this in deciding whether or not to invest time and effort in 
seeking a buyer. Real property is a different matter. In the halcyon early years of 
this decade, real estate prices often rose, even over the life of an ordinary chapter 7 
liquidation. In these cases, historic value serves the trustee not at all. 
On the other hand, it should be remembered that a debtor must file her Schedule 
C very soon after a voluntary bankruptcy petition. 223 Given this timeline, the 
difference between historic valuation and present valuation is likely to be minimal. 
So, as a practical matter, it is not consequential that Column 4 be governed by 
valuation on the day of the bankruptcy petition. 
Has the majority read section 522(a){2) out of the Bankruptcy Code-that to­
be-avoided interpretative faux pas? I think the Schwab majority can be acquitted of 
this sin. True, its limitation to the governance of Column 4 reduces it in dignity and 
renders it slightly absurd, but nevertheless it still has an Osric-like role in the great 
drama of bankruptcy exemption procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the opinions in Schwab may seem a dense squabble over the meaning 
of bureaucratic forms, behind the majority opinion is complete re-theorization of the 
exemption process in bankruptcy. The majority finds that valuation plays no role in 
the exemption process. No magic transformation of a monetarily limited exemption 
into an in-kind exemption occurs just because the debtor recites a below-limit value 
to the property on her Schedule C. As valuation plays no role in the exemption 
process, the trustee need never object to the debtor's estimate of the market value of 
the thing to be exempted. In this vision, there is a fundamental difference between 
222 If this is always a winning objection, then the court actually never values the thing, even if the Schwab
minority's vision is true.223 The Rules are confusing on this point. According to Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c), documents required 
under Rule 1007(b)(l) must be filed within 15 days of the bankruptcy petition. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(c). 
Rule 1007(b )(1 )(A) refers to "schedules of assets and liabilities," but does not refer expressly to Schedule C. 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(l)(A). But Rule 4003(a) indicates that, "[i]fthe debtor fails to claim exemptions 
or file the schedule within the time specified in Rule 1007, a dependent of the debtor may file the list within 
30 days thereafter." FED. R BANKR P. 4003(a). Rule 4003(a) therefore contemplates that the time limit of 
Rule 1007(c) is supposed to apply to Schedule C. See Ahart, supra note 72, at 247. 
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in-kind exemptions and monetarily limited exemptions. In-kind exemptions are in 
fact rarely litigated. When they exist, the trustee's hypothetical judicial lien never 
attaches. But where the exemption is monetarily limited, the trustee's judicial lien 
attaches and remains in place until the property is sold or the trustee abandons his 
rights back to the debtor. 
